The ability to predict performance across a variety of related tasks from the physical properties of the stimulus and the nature of the task is a fundamental goal of psychological inquiry. Two tasks that are of particular importance to the survival of all biological organisms are stimulus identification and categorization . In identification, a unique label is associated with each stimulus, whereas in categorization, many stimuli have the same label. For example, the mother bird needs to identify its chick from among a group of other chicks, whereas the mother bird need only categorize other animals as friend or foe. The overriding goals of this article are to examine the separate effects of perceptual and decisional processes on identification and categorization performance and to determine how attentional processes influence perceptual and decisional processes in each task. This article extends results previously obtained with separable-dimension stimuli (Maddox, 2001 ) to integral-dimension stimuli.
The aims of our study were threefold. First, we examined the viability of the matching task (described later) as a method for estimating the perceptual representation of integral-dimension stimuli. To date, the matching task has been used only with separable-dimension stimuli (Alfonso-Reese, 2001; Maddox, 2001; Maddox & Bogdanov, 2000) . Second, we tested the (often implicit) assumption that changes in task demand affect decision processes while leaving the perceptual representation unchanged.
To achieve this goal, we held fixed the perceptual representation estimated from the matching task while attempting to account simultaneously for identification and categorization performance. Finally, we tested the hypothesis, supported in the data from Maddox (2001) , that decisional selective attention tasks lead to a form of perceptual and decisional selective attention, whereas decisional integration categorization tasks affect only decision processes.
To elaborate, in some situations a specific aspect of the environment (or stimulus) is relevant to solving a categorization problem, and all other aspects are irrelevant. For example, to determine whether a tennis volley is "long," the back line judge need only determine whether the ball bounced on or past the back line. The back judge can ignore the speed at which the ball is traveling, its location relative to the sidelines, its trajectory, and so forth. This is referred to as a decisional selective attention task because information about only one perceptual dimension is needed to generate an accurate response. In other words, the back line judge can set a decision criterion on location relative to the back line while excluding all other perceptual information from the decision. Under these conditions, a fine-tuning or sharpening of the perceptual representation along the relevant dimension could improve performance. This fine-tuning is referred to as perceptual selective attention because attentional processes are focused selectively on one aspect of the perceptual representation. In other situations, several aspects of the environment (or stimulus) are relevant to solving a task. For example, to determine whether a field goal was successful in football, the referee needs to determine whether the ball went beyond the crossbar and passed between the uprights. This requires that the referee integrate information from several perceptual dimensions to generate an accurate response and thus is referred to as a decisional integration task. Under these conditions, a fine-tuning of the perceptual representation along one of these perceptual dimensions would not be advantageous. Given the large amount of stimulation from the environment at any one time and the limited capacity of our attention systems, it seems reasonable to suppose that perceptual attentional processes might be invoked to improve performance when a decisional selective attention strategy is optimal and might not be invoked when information integration is required.
An understanding of the complex interplay among attentional, perceptual, and decisional processes in identification and categorization requires a theory that acknowledges their separate and unique influences. General recognition theory (GRT; Ashby & Townsend, 1986) , a multidimensional generalization of signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1967; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991) , represents such a theory. The next section briefly introduces GRT (for details, see Ashby & Lee, 1991; Ashby & Perrin, 1988; Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Maddox, 2001 Maddox, , 2002 ; an interesting alternative approach is offered by Huettel & Lockhead, 1999) . We then review the relevant literature, followed by an introduction to the present experiment. The fifth section reports the theoretical analyses, and the final section provides a summary and discussion.
GRT

Perceptual Representation Assumptions
Consider nine stimuli constructed from the factorial combination of three levels along Component A and three levels along Component B, as depicted in Figure 1A . GRT takes as its fundamental axiom that repeated presentations of the same stimulus yield different perceptual effects; that is, perceptual noise exists (e.g., Ashby & Lee, 1993; Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Geisler, 1989; Green & Swets, 1967; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991) . Thus, over trials, a single multidimensional stimulus is represented perceptually by a multivariate probability distribution (Ashby & Lee, 1993) . In the case of a two-dimensional stimulus, a bivariate normal distribution is assumed to represent the set of percepts. A bivariate normal distribution is described by a mean and variance along each dimension along with a covariance term: x , y , x 2 , y 2 , and cov xy , where the subscripts x and y denote dimensions x and y. Figure 1B depicts equal likelihood contours for hypothetical perceptual distributions associated with the nine stimuli shown in Figure 1A . Two forms of perceptual interaction are important in GRT: perceptual independence and perceptual separability. Perceptual independence holds for a single stimulus if and only if the perceptual effects for dimensions x and y are statistically independent (i.e., when cov xy ϭ 0 for bivariate normal distributions; see Ashby, 1988; Ashby & Maddox, 1991; Ashby & Townsend, 1986; and Perrin & Ashby, 1991 , for empirical tests of perceptual independence). Perceptual independence holds when the major and minor axes of the equal likelihood contour are parallel to the coordinate axes. All nine equal likelihood contours shown in Figure 1B satisfy perceptual independence, because all are characterized by ellipses whose major and minor axes are parallel with the coordinate axes. If any of the ellipses would have been tilted toward the left or toward the right, then perceptual independence would have been violated. The "spread" of the ellipses along the x-axis and y-axis provides information regarding perceptual variance. For example, in Figure 1B , the three stimuli at Level 1 along Component B (i.e., B1) are taller than they are wide, representing a situation in which there is more perceptual variance along dimension y than along dimension x. Analogously, the three stimuli at Level 2 along Component B (i.e., B2) and the three stimuli at Level 3 along Component B (i.e., B3) are wider than they are tall, representing a situation in which there is more perceptual variance along dimension x than along dimension y.
Perceptual separability holds for a group of stimuli when the marginal distribution of perceptual effects for a particular component is unaffected by the level of the other component. More formally, dimension x is perceptually separable from dimension y when g i1 (x) ϭ g i2 (x) ϭ . . . ϭ g in (x), where g ij (x) is the marginal perceptual distribution along dimension x for the stimulus at level i along dimension x and level j along dimension y (see Ashby & Townsend, 1986 , for details). In Figure 1B , dimension y is perceptually separable from dimension x, because the marginal distributions for each level along dimension y are unaffected by the level along dimension x. To see this, note that y (represented by the center of the equal likelihood contour along dimension y) and y 2 (represented by the spread of the equal likelihood contour along dimension y) are identical across levels of x for any given level of y. In Figure 1B , dimension x is not perceptually separable from dimension y. To see this, note that x and x 2 are not identical across levels of y for any given level of x. In addition, note that perceptual independence is a property associated with a single stimulus, whereas perceptual separability is a property associated with a group of stimuli. 
Decision Process Assumptions
In GRT, the experienced observer learns to divide the perceptual space into response regions and assigns a single response to each region. The partitions between response regions are called decision bounds. On each trial, the observer determines the location of the perceptual effect and gives the response associated with that region of the perceptual space. Decision bounds and the resulting response regions can come in many forms (Ashby, Waldron, Lee, & Berkman, 2001; Maddox, 2001 Maddox, , 2002 . Details of the response regions examined in this article are reserved for the Results and Theoretical Analyses section.
Perceptual and Decisional Attention Processes
Attentional processes are critical to an understanding of identification and categorization performance (Ashby & Lee, 1991; Maddox, 2001 Maddox, , 2002 Maddox & Ashby, 1996; Nosofsky, 1986 Nosofsky, , 1987 . Although some categorization theories treat attention as a unitary process (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986) , there is a growing body of research suggesting that the human attention system is served by separate subsystems, one perceptual and one decisional (e.g., Johnston, McCann, & Remington, 1995; Pashler, 1989 Pashler, , 1991 Pashler, , 1993 Posner, 1993; Posner & Petersen, 1990; Posner, Sandson, Dhawan, & Shulman, 1989 ; model-based implementations of multiple attention systems can be found in Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998; Erickson & Kruschke, 1998; Lamberts, 1995 Lamberts, , 1998 and Maddox, Ashby, & Waldron, 2002) . The current thinking is that the perceptual attention system is mediated by posterior brain structures (e.g., the visual cortex, much of the posterior parietal cortex, the pulvinar, and the superior colliculus; Olshausen, Anderson, & Van Essen, 1993; Posner & Petersen, 1990) , and the decisional attention system is mediated by anterior brain structures (e.g., the anterior cingulate, the prefrontal cortex, and perhaps the basal ganglia and pulvinar; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; LaBerge, 1995 LaBerge, , 1997 Posner & Petersen, 1990) .
In GRT, perceptual attention processes affect perceptual variances, and decisional attention processes affect response regions. Perceptual selective attention results when the perceptual noise (or variance) along the attended dimension is reduced relative to the perceptual noise along the unattended dimension. The notion that attention reduces perceptual variability has a long history in signal detection theory (Braida & Durlach, 1972; Luce & Green, 1978; Macmillan, Goldberg, & Braida, 1988) . Perceptual selective attention effects can vary in magnitude. Figure 2A displays hypothetical contours of equal likelihood for two stimuli in which there is equal perceptual attention to both dimensions. Figure 2C depicts a case in which there is moderate perceptual selective attention to dimension x, and Figure 2E depicts a strong perceptual selective attention to dimension x. Note that as one moves from Figure 2A to 2C to 2E, the perceptual variability along dimension x decreases, whereas the perceptual variability along dimension y increases, indicating an increase in the magnitude of perceptual selective attention to dimension x. The reduction in perceptual variability increases perceptual discriminability (dЈ) along dimension x.
Decisional selective attention results when the decision bound is parallel to one of the coordinate axes. Thus, the decision is determined only by the value along one dimension and is unaffected by the value along the other dimension (this is also referred to as decisional separability; Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Maddox, 1992) . As the decision bound moves away from parallel, the magnitude of the decisional selective attention weakens. Equal decisional attention to both dimensions is depicted in Figure 2B by the broken-line decision bound with a unit slope. Moderate decisional selective attention to dimension x is depicted in Figure 2D ; the broken-line decision bound has a slope greater than 1, implying that more weight in the decision is being placed on dimension x. Perfect decisional selective attention to dimension x is depicted in Figure 2F ; the decision bound is parallel to the y dimension, implying that no weight in the decision is being placed on dimension y. An advantage of GRT is that perceptual and decisional selective attention can be quantified by examining the perceptual noise and decision bound parameters.
Review of the Relevant Literature
Recently, Maddox (2001) examined the influence of perceptual and decisional processes on performance in an identification task and a series of categorization tasks using a fixed set of stimuli constructed from the separable dimensions of length and orientation. Maddox found that the perceptual representation estimated Figure 2 . Hypothetical contours of equal likelihood for two stimuli in which there is equal perceptual attention to both dimensions (A), moderate perceptual elective attention to dimension x (C), and strong perceptual selective attention to dimension x (E). Also shown are hypothetical decision bounds (denoted by broken lines) for a situation with equal decisional attention to both dimensions (B), moderate decisional selective attention to dimension x (D), and perfect decisional selective attention to dimension x (F). from a matching task (Alfonso-Reese, 1996 ; described in detail shortly) provided a good simultaneous account of identification and categorization performance with one caveat. In decisional selective attention categorization tasks, a form of perceptual selective attention emerged in which the perceptual variance along the relevant dimension was reduced relative to the perceptual variance along the irrelevant dimension.
The present study sought to replicate Maddox's (2001) investigation and extend it to the identification and categorization of highly integral-dimension stimuli. Following Maddox (2001) , each observer completed a large number of sessions involving matching, identification, and several different categorization tasks with a fixed set of iso-hue Munsell color patches that varied in brightness and saturation. The perceptual representation estimated from the matching task data was held fixed in an attempt to account simultaneously for identification and categorization performance. A major focus was on the decisional selective attention categorization tasks, with the aim of determining how well observers can perform such tasks, and whether decisional selective attention leads to perceptual selective attention. This is an important issue, because integral-dimension stimuli are thought to be processed holistically and to be difficult to attend selectively (for reviews, see Garner, 1974; Maddox, 1992) .
In two seminal studies, Nosofsky (1986 Nosofsky ( , 1987 ; see also Shepard & Chang, 1963; Shepard, Hovland, & Jenkins, 1961) examined the identification-categorization relationship for both separable-and integral-dimension stimuli. Nosofsky's approach was to use the identification data to estimate a multidimensional scaling (MDS) psychological space for the stimuli in which it was assumed that each stimulus was represented by a point in the MDS space. In the fitting of categorization, attentional processes were allowed to modify the similarity relations among exemplars in this space by stretching and shrinking the space along the dimensional axes. In the case of both separable-and integral-dimension stimuli, Nosofsky found that attentional processes affected the MDS psychological space in the decisional selective attention conditions but had no effect in the decisional integration conditions (but see . However, the magnitude of the attentional effect in the decisional selective attention conditions differed across the two studies, yielding a strong effect for separable-dimension stimuli and a weaker effect for integral-dimension stimuli. Within the framework of Nosofsky's model, perfect selective attention results when the attention weight parameter, w, is 1, and equal attention results when w is .5. With separable-dimension stimuli, the attention weight in the decisional selective attention condition was .96. With integral-dimension stimuli, on the other hand, it was .82 in the decisional selective attention to brightness condition and .75 in the decisional selective attention to saturation condition. These findings suggest that attentional processes play a role for both separable-and integral-dimension stimuli but that attention operates less efficiently with integral dimensions, in particular saturation.
Although the results just described are important, one drawback of Nosofsky's approach is that the locus of the attentional effect is nonidentifiable. In particular, within this theoretical framework it is not possible to determine whether the selective attention effect is perceptual, decisional, or both. Given the evidence for separate attentional systems reviewed earlier, this seems especially problematic. The current study remedied this problem by applying a version of GRT that contains parameters associated with perceptual and decisional processes that are separately identifiable.
Perceptual Matching, Identification, and Categorization Experiment
Four observers completed ten 360-trial sessions of perceptual matching followed by twelve 480-trial sessions of identification using 18 iso-hue Munsell color patches that varied in brightness and saturation. After the identification task, each observer completed seven 800-trial sessions in each of four separate categorization conditions: two decisional selective attention conditions and two decisional integration conditions involving the same 18 stimuli. Because of the concern over averaged data, all analyses were performed at the level of the individual observer (Ashby, Maddox, & Lee, 1994; Estes, 1956; Maddox, 1999; Smith & Minda, 1998) .
Method
Observers
Four observers solicited from the University of Texas community were paid for their participation. All observers had 20/20 vision or vision corrected to 20/20. The same 4 observers participated in all three tasks.
Stimuli
The stimulus set consisted of eighteen 150 ϫ 150 pixel Munsell color patches, all of 10PB (purple-blue) hue, that varied along the integral dimensions of saturation and brightness (Garner, 1974; Maddox, 1992) . (Accurate representation of the Munsell color system on the CRT and color monitor calibration were achieved with a Photoresearch Spectrascan 704 Colorimeter and the relevant equations of Brainard [1989] and Travis [1991] .) These stimuli represented a subset taken from a larger group of 36 stimuli constructed from six levels of brightness and six levels of saturation. The six levels of brightness ("value" in the Munsell system) were 6.0, 6.5, 7.0, 7.5, 8.0, and 8.5. The six levels of saturation ("chroma" in the Munsell system) were 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 6.0, 7.0, and 8.0. Nickerson's (1936) work suggested that one unit of value is perceptually equivalent to two units of chroma, so we scaled the values by two for all model-based analyses. The 18 stimuli and a numbering scheme are depicted in Figure  3A . Observers were seated approximately 60 cm from the computer screen, and each stimulus subtended a visual angle of approximately 4°. The stimuli were computer generated and displayed on a 21-in. (53-cm) monitor with 1360 ϫ 1024 resolution in a dimly lit room. The experiments were run in MATLAB through the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) .
Procedure
Matching task. On each trial, one of the 18 stimuli was selected at random with equal probability. This served as the standard stimulus on that trial. Both the standard and a comparison stimulus were centered vertically on the screen. The center of the standard stimulus was placed 275 pixels to the left of the center of the screen, and the center of the comparison stimulus was placed 275 pixels to the right of the center of the screen. The brightness of the comparison stimulus was determined by taking a random sample from a uniform distribution with a mean equal to the brightness of the standard stimulus and a range of four brightness units. The saturation of the comparison stimulus was determined by taking a random sample from a uniform distribution with a mean equal to the saturation of the standard stimulus and a range of two saturation units. The observer's task was to adjust the brightness and saturation of the comparison stimulus until it was perceived (judged) to "match" the standard stimulus. The mouse controlled the adjustments. Once the observer perceived that the comparison and standard stimuli matched, he or she pressed the mouse button. The observer then pressed a button to "accept" the current match and initiate the next trial or to "reject" the current match and resume the matching process for the same standard stimulus. The observer was instructed to be "as accurate as possible." Each session consisted of four blocks of 90 trials, with breaks between each block.
Identification task. On each trial, one of the 18 stimuli was selected at random with equal probability. The stimulus was presented centered on the computer monitor for 100 ms, followed by a gray mask and then a 6 ϫ 6 checkerboard response grid. The response grid was constructed to mimic the stimulus space, with the horizontal dimension denoting brightness and the vertical dimension denoting saturation. The response grid had 18 valid locations, one for each stimulus, and 18 invalid locations that were blacked out. The observer's task was to identify the response grid associated with the presented stimulus. To respond, the observer moved the cursor to one of the 18 valid locations and clicked on the mouse button. The selected location was then filled with a gray square, and the location associated with the correct identification response was highlighted to provide the observer with corrective feedback. Corrective feedback was presented for 500 ms, followed by a 1,000-ms blank screen and initiation of the next trial.
Categorization task. Each observer completed four separate categorization conditions. The stimulus-to-category response mappings for each categorization condition are depicted in Figure 3B -3E. In the decisional selective attention to brightness condition (DSAB condition; Figure 3B ), the "dim" color patches were assigned to Category A, and the "bright" color patches were assigned to Category B. The saturation of the color patch was irrelevant. In the decisional selective attention to saturation condition (DSAS condition; Figure 3C ), the "low-saturation" color patches were assigned to Category A, and the "high-saturation" color patches were assigned to Category B. The brightness of the color patch was irrelevant. These were both decisional selective attention conditions, because one dimension of the stimulus was relevant and the other was not. Two categorization conditions required decisional integration of brightness and saturation information. In the linear integration condition (LI condition; Figure 3D ), accurate performance required the application of a decision rule based on a linear function of brightness and saturation. In the nonlinear integration condition (NLI condition; Figure 3E ), accurate performance required the application of a decision rule based on a nonlinear function of brightness and saturation. On each categorization trial, one of the 18 stimuli was selected at random with equal probability. The stimulus was presented centered on the computer monitor for 100 ms, and was followed by a pattern mask. The observer responded by pressing one key for Category A (the Z key) and another key for Category B (the / key). After the observer's response, the correct category label (A or B) was displayed on the screen for 500 ms, followed by a 1,000-ms blank screen and initiation of the next trial. The condition orders were as follows: Observer 1, NLI, LI, DSAS, and DSAB; Observer 2, LI, NLI, DSAB, and DSAS; Observer 3, NLI, LI, DSAB, and DSAS; and Observer 4, LI, NLI, DSAS, and DSAB.
Results and Theoretical Analyses
The first session of each task was considered practice and was excluded from all analyses. Presentation of the results and theoretical analyses is organized as follows. First, the matching data are summarized and are used to derive an initial perceptual representation. Second, the matching task perceptual representation is used, along with GRT, to quantitatively predict identification performance. Third, the matching task perceptual representation is used, along with GRT, to quantitatively predict categorization performance. The aim is to determine whether the matching task perceptual representation provides a good simultaneous account of both identification and categorization performance. Finally, we undertake a test of the hypothesis that the demands of the decisional selective attention tasks lead to changes in both the perceptual representation and response regions, whereas the demands of the decisional integration tasks lead to changes only in the response regions.
Matching Experiment
The observer's task on each matching trial was to adjust the saturation and brightness of the comparison stimulus until it was perceived to "match" the standard stimulus. Thus, on each matching trial, we know the "true" saturation and brightness and have an estimate of the "perceived" saturation and brightness. To estimate the perceptual distribution parameters associated with each standard stimulus, we computed the sample brightness and saturation means (mean vector entries), the sample brightness and saturation variances, and the sample brightness-saturation covariance (covariance matrix entries).
1 This process was repeated for each of the 18 stimuli separately by observer. Figure 4 displays the 18 Several aspects of these plots are of interest. First, for all 4 observers, the variability in perceived saturation was generally larger than the variability in perceived brightness. This held for 16, 18, 9, and 17 of the 18 stimuli for Observers 1-4, respectively. Second, among all 4 observers, there was evidence of a strong negative perceptual dependence between perceived brightness and saturation. The perceptual dependence (correlation) was significantly less than zero for 17, 15, 14, and 14 of the 18 stimuli for Observers 1-4, respectively. In addition, when perceptual independence was satisfied, it tended to hold for the weakly saturated stimuli. Finally, note that the resulting perceptual representations were similar across observers. The similarity among the equal likelihood contours across stimuli and observers provides initial support for the validity of the matching task as a method for approximating the perceptual distributions of integral-dimension stimuli. Of course, the more rigorous test is the examination (described later) of the ability of the matching task perceptual representation to account simultaneously for identification and categorization performance.
It is important to note that these analyses provide only a rough estimate of perceptual noise; they ignored the possibility that there was noise in the decision process (termed criterial noise). Criterial noise was minimized in the matching task by (a) including highly trained observers, (b) presenting the standard and comparison stimuli simultaneously, and (c) allowing observers unlimited time to perform each trial. However, a certain amount of criterial noise was probably not taken into account. Even so, the advantage of estimating the perceptual representation from matching and then using that representation to predict identification and categorization performance is that any changes in perceptual and criterial noise across tasks can be estimated. Although a "true" measure of perceptual noise would be optimal, this multiple-task approach allowed us to adequately tease apart these two sources of noise.
Predicting Identification From Perceptual Matching
Overall identification accuracy rates were 31.4%, 50.9%, 56.2%, and 31.5% for Observers 1-4, respectively. For technical reasons (detailed in Maddox, 2001) , the method of maximum likelihood could not be used to estimate the model parameters. Instead, the models were fit to the data through an iterative search routine that minimized the sum of the squared errors (SSE) between the predicted and observed frequencies for each of the 324 (18 ϫ 18) cells in the confusion matrix (Ashby & Lee, 1991; Ashby et al., 2001; Maddox, 2001; Maddox & Ashby, 1996) . Several of the models had a nested structure, and so it was possible to test whether the extra parameters of a more general model led to a significant improvement in fit over the more restricted model. Let SSE r and SSE g denote the SSE for the restricted and more general models, respectively. In addition, let df r and df g denote the degrees of freedom for these models. Then, under the null hypothesis that the restricted model is the correct model, the statistic
has an approximately F distribution with df r Ϫ df g degrees of freedom in the numerator and df g degrees of freedom in the denominator (e.g., Khuri & Cornell, 1987) .
3
Perceptual representation assumptions. The matching task equal likelihood contours presented in Figure 4 were assumed to form the basis of the perceptual representation of identification. Recall, however, that the exposure duration was limited to 100 ms in identification and was unlimited in matching. Thus, more perceptual information was available on each trial in the matching task than in the identification task, resulting in less perceptual variability in matching. In addition, the decision problem was different in the two tasks, probably leading to differences in criterial noise. Although perceptual noise and criterial noise are nonidentifiable in matching and identification, it is important to accommodate changes across these two tasks. Following Maddox (2001; see also Maddox & Ashby, 1996; Maddox & Bogdanov, 2000) , the perceptual noise estimates from the matching task were scaled by adding a single fixed constant simultaneously to each of the 18 brightness variances and by adding a single fixed constant simultaneously to each of the 18 saturation variances. These constants were estimated from the data and represented the change in perceptual and criterial noise from matching to identification. It is important to note that although the perceptual noise was allowed to be different across matching and identification, the "global" structure of the perceptual representation derived from matching was held fixed in identification. Specifically, the perceptual means and perceptual correlations were unchanged, and the overall relations 2 The likelihood value (.003 in this case) is arbitrary and does not affect the shape or relations among the contours of equal likelihood; it affects only their size. A larger likelihood value would result in smaller elliptical contours of equal likelihood, whereas a smaller likelihood value would result in larger elliptical contours of equal likelihood. 3 The results of this test must be interpreted with caution because the confusion matrix frequencies are assumed to be independent, which is probably not the case. Even so, Lee (1991, 1992) showed that these F tests generally agree with tests based on a maximum likelihood approach that do not assume independence. among perceptual noise values remained constant. This is referred to as the matching perceptual representation. We also fit a version of GRT that allowed the perceptual distribution parameters for each of the 18 stimuli to be freely estimated. This required 36 perceptual distribution mean parameters, 36 perceptual variance parameters, and 18 perceptual covariance parameters. This is referred to as the identification perceptual representation.
Response region assumptions. Response regions can be constructed in a number of ways (Ashby et al., 2001) . For example, decision bounds could satisfy decisional separability or be linear or quadratic in form. In the present application, we assume that each stimulus has associated with it a response region "unit." On each trial, the observer determines which unit is closest to the perceptual effect and provides the associated response. Note that this is equivalent to minimum distance classification . Hypothetical response regions and response region units for the nine stimuli in Figure 1A (whose hypothetical perceptual distributions are presented in Figure 1B ) are displayed in Figure  1C . We chose this approach because of its neurobiological plausibility (Ashby et al., 2001) , as described later in the General Discussion section.
Two assumptions about the location of the response region units were tested. In the fixed response region unit model, we assumed that the unit associated with response i was fixed at the location of the perceptual mean associated with stimulus i, thus requiring no free parameters. In the free response region unit model, we assumed that the location of each unit was a free parameter. Because each unit was defined by its location in the brightness-saturation space, this model had 36 response region unit parameters. The two perceptual representation assumptions (matching and identification) were combined factorially with the two response region unit assumptions (fixed and free), yielding four unique models.
The number of free parameters, SSE, and percentage of variance accounted for by each model in the case of each observer are presented in Table 1 . An F test was conducted to determine whether the additional free parameters of the free response region unit model provided a significant improvement in fit over the fixed response region unit model. For all 4 observers and for both the matching and identification perceptual representations, the free response region unit model provided a significant improvement in fit: matching perceptual representation, Fs(36, 268) ϭ 15.1, 12.1, 9.0, and 10.1, ps Ͻ .001, for Observers 1-4, respectively, and identification perceptual representation, Fs(32, 186) ϭ 3.8, 12.4, 13.3, and 11.9, ps Ͻ .01, for Observers 1-4, respectively. The improvement in SSE ranged from 2-fold to 3-fold for the matching perceptual representation and from 1.5-fold to 3-fold for the identification perceptual representation. The improvement in percentage of variance accounted for ranged from 3% to 16% for the matching perceptual representation and from 2% to 6% for the identification perceptual representation.
Next, an F test was conducted to determine whether the extra free parameters of the free response region unit model that assumed the identification perceptual representation provided a significant improvement in fit over the free response region unit model that assumed the matching perceptual representation. In the case of all 4 observers, estimating the perceptual representation from the identification data provided a significant improvement in fit over the case in which the matching task perceptual represen- tation was used to predict identification performance, Fs(82, 186) ϭ 2.6, 4.3, 3.8, and 4.9, ps Ͻ .01, for Observers 1-4, respectively. Although statistically significant, it is worth noting that the improvement in fit was relatively small (approximately a 2.5-fold SSE improvement and a 4% improvement in percentage of variance accounted for). Perhaps more important, this small improvement in fit was obtained by adding 86 parameters, whereas the larger improvement in fit for the free response region unit model over the fixed response region unit model required only 36 additional response region parameters. Perhaps most important, the matching perceptual representation provided an excellent account of the data, accounting on average for 93.5% of the variance in the identification data. Taken together, these analyses suggest that the matching task does provide a good initial perceptual representation for identification, nearly as good as the perceptual representation freely estimated from identification confusion. The response region units and the associated response regions from the free response region unit model that assumed the matching perceptual representation for each observer are displayed in Figure 5 .
Predicting Categorization From Perceptual Matching
The accuracy rates for the two decisional selective attention conditions (DSAB and DSAS) and the two decisional integration conditions (LI and NLI) for each observer are presented in Table 2 . The data modeled were the observed response frequencies (for Categories A and B) for each of the 18 stimuli in each of four categorization conditions, resulting in 72 degrees of freedom. The technical difficulties that precluded the use of maximum likelihood parameter estimation in identification were not present in the categorization conditions. Thus, the model parameters were estimated through maximum likelihood procedures (Ashby, 1992b ; T. D. Wickens, 1982) , and the goodness-of-fit statistic was ϪlnL, where L is the likelihood of the model given the categorization data (T. D. Wickens, 1982) . In the case of nested models, G 2 tests were used to determine the most parsimonious model.
Perceptual representation assumptions. Three hypotheses regarding the nature of the perceptual representation during categorization were examined. The no perceptual selective attention hypothesis assumed that the initial perceptual representation estimated from the matching task was the correct perceptual representation for categorization and that this perceptual representation was unaffected by (or invariant across) different categorization decision rules. The model does allow for the possibility of greater perceptual noise in categorization by estimating the brightness and saturation scalars described earlier. The perceptual selective attention hypothesis assumed that the decisional selective attention conditions altered the perceptual representation by reducing the perceptual variance along the relevant dimension relative to the perceptual variance along the irrelevant dimension but that the decisional integration conditions did not alter systematically the perceptual representation. To instantiate this hypothesis, we applied two additive scalars to the perceptual noise estimates only for the data from the two decisional selective attention conditions. Specifically, the perceptual variances along the relevant and irrelevant dimensions for each stimulus, i, i,rel 2 and i,irrel 2 , were transformed into i,rel 2 ϩ ⌬ rel and i,irrel 2 ϩ ⌬ irrel . The relevant dimension scalar, ⌬ rel , was applied simultaneously to the brightness perceptual variance in the DSAB condition and to the saturation perceptual variance in the DSAS condition. The irrelevant dimension scalar, ⌬ irrel , was applied simultaneously to the saturation perceptual variance in the DSAB condition and to the brightness perceptual variance in the DSAS condition.
The perceptual selective attention to brightness hypothesis assumed that decisional selective attention to brightness altered the perceptual representation by reducing the brightness perceptual variance relative to the saturation perceptual variance but that the decisional selective attention to saturation and decisional integration conditions did not alter systematically the perceptual representation. To instantiate this hypothesis, we applied one additive scalar to the brightness perceptual noise value and another to the saturation perceptual noise value, but only in the DSAB condition. Recall that although Nosofsky (1987) found moderate selective attention in the DSAB condition (w ϭ .82) and weak selective attention in the DSAS condition (w ϭ .75), his theoretical approach did not allow him to determine whether this effect was perceptual or decisional. The two perceptual selective attention Note. DSAB ϭ decisional selective attention to brightness condition; DSAS ϭ decisional selective attention to saturation condition; LI ϭ linear integration condition; NLI ϭ nonlinear integration condition.
hypotheses tested in the current work were developed to test the hypothesis that Nosofsky's results were due to perceptual selective attention processes (decision processing explanations are outlined subsequently). Because the scalars used to test this hypothesis were assumed to measure perceptual processes only, it was imperative that we obtain a separate and unique estimate of criterial noise. A series of decision bound models derived from GRT have been developed that allow one to estimate separately the effects of perceptual and criterial noise (for details, see Ashby, 1992a; .
Response region assumptions. Decision bound models assume that there will be trial-by-trial fluctuations in memory for the location of the decision bounds, and in many cases this criterial noise is identifiable. In the present application, we assumed linear decision bounds in the two decisional selective attention conditions and quadratic decision bounds in the two dimensional integration conditions. Each linear bound required that a slope and intercept be estimated, and each quadratic decision bound required that five quadratic equation coefficients be estimated for a total of 14 decision bound parameters. In addition, three criterial noise parameters were estimated: one for the NLI condition, one for the LI condition, and a single criterial noise parameter estimated simultaneously for both decisional selective attention conditions. The criterial noise parameter had to be "yoked" across the two decisional selective attention conditions so that it would be identifiable from perceptual noise (Maddox, 2001) . (The possibility of quadratic bounds being used in all four conditions was tested, but this test did not lead to a significant improvement in fit and is not discussed further.)
The number of free parameters, goodness of fit, and percentage of variance accounted for by the no perceptual selective attention, perceptual selective attention, and perceptual selective attention to brightness models for each categorization condition are presented in Table 3 . The best fit based on G 2 tests (in the row labeled Sum) for each observer is shown in italics. One of the two perceptual selective attention models was superior to the no perceptual selective attention model in the case of all 4 observers. This replicated Maddox's (2001) findings with separable-dimension stimuli and extended the result to integral-dimension stimuli. A comparison of the two perceptual selective attention models suggested that both the DSAB and the DSAS conditions led to changes in perceptual processing for Observers 1 and 4, whereas the data from Observers 2 and 3 suggested that only the DSAB condition affected perceptual processing. An examination of the fit values for each condition separately suggests that the performance improvement for the best-fitting model was due to better accounts of the data from the two decisional selective attention conditions and the LI condition. Interestingly, the models differed little in their ability to account for the NLI condition. The best-fitting model provided a good account of the data, with the percentage of variance accounted for ranging from 92%-99%. Thus, it appears that the matching task perceptual representation provides a good method for deriving an initial perceptual representation for both identification and categorization with integral-dimension stimuli.
The perceptual selective attention models were developed to test the hypothesis that the demands of the decisional selective attention task allow an observer to use perceptual selective attention processes to reduce the perceptual variance along the decisionally relevant dimension. However, the models are not constrained in this way; rather, the best-fitting model parameters could suggest the opposite effect (i.e., reduced perceptual variability along the irrelevant dimension relative to the relevant dimension) or no systematic effect of decisional selective attention on perceptual variability. To determine whether decisional selective attention led to perceptual selective attention, we examined the perceptual noise scalar values from the best-fitting perceptual selective attention model. These values are displayed in Table 4 . In support of the perceptual selective attention hypothesis, the scalar along the relevant dimension was always smaller than the scalar along the irrelevant dimension.
With respect to perceptual selective attention along the saturation dimension, the two perceptual selective attention models represent extreme positions on a continuum. Specifically, one model assumes no perceptual selective attention to saturation, Note. Italicized values represent best fits. PSA ϭ perceptual selective attention; PSAB ϭ perceptual selective attention to brightness; DSAB ϭ decisional selective attention to brightness condition; DSAS ϭ decisional selective attention to saturation condition; LI ϭ linear integration condition; NLI ϭ nonlinear integration condition. a Number of free parameters.
whereas the other model assumes that the magnitude of perceptual selective attention to saturation is equivalent to that applied to brightness. To test whether perceptual selective attention to saturation exists but is of a weaker magnitude than that for brightness, we applied a model that estimated one scalar for brightness when it was relevant (i.e., in the decisional selective attention to brightness task), one scalar for saturation when it was relevant (i.e., in the decisional selective attention to saturation task), and one scalar applied to the irrelevant dimension. In the case of all 4 observers, this model did not provide a significant improvement in fit over the best-fitting models in Table 3 . However, among all observers, the magnitude of the perceptual selective attention effect was larger for brightness than for saturation. We also expect that the need for decisional selective attention will lead to the use of decision bounds that are nearly orthogonal to the relevant dimension axis (i.e., that nearly satisfy decisional selective attention). Table 5 displays the absolute deviation between the best-fitting decision bound slope and the slope associated with perfect decisional selective attention (i.e., a slope of zero) for the DSAS and DSAB conditions. As the absolute deviation approaches zero, the observer's decision strategy approaches that of perfect decisional selective attention. As the absolute deviation approaches one, the observer's decision strategy approaches that of equal attention to both dimensions. Two results stand out. First, in every case, more decisional selective attention was being paid to the relevant dimension. In other words, the absolute deviations were closer to zero than they were to one. Second, there appeared to be little difference in observers' ability to apply a decisional selective attention strategy to brightness or saturation. For 2 observers decisional selective attention was slightly better to saturation, and for 2 it was slightly better (or equal) to brightness. In fact, averaged across observers, the absolute slope deviations were .10 for brightness and .11 for saturation. This latter result, along with the perceptual selective attention results outlined earlier, suggests that the weaker selective attention effect observed by Nosofsky (1987) for saturation than for brightness classification tasks was due to differences in perceptual selective attention processes and not to differences in decisional selective attention processes.
Predicting categorization from identification. A set of analyses identical to those just outlined were undertaken but with the matching perceptual representation replaced by the identification perceptual representation. The pattern of results was remarkably similar to that for the matching task perceptual representation. Both perceptual representations provided good accounts of the data, accounting (on average) for 96.0% and 94.0% of the variance in the categorization data for the matching and identification perceptual representations, respectively, although there was a consistent advantage for the matching task perceptual representation.
Discussion
Observers performed perceptual matching, identification, and categorization with 18 iso-hue color patches that varied along the integral dimensions of brightness and saturation. In the matching task, observers were required to adjust the saturation and brightness of a "comparison" stimulus to that of a "standard" stimulus. Brightness and saturation mean, variance, and covariance terms were estimated from the distribution of "perceived matches" and were assumed to denote the perceptual distribution parameters. GRT (Ashby & Townsend, 1986 ) was applied to quantify the separate influences of perceptual processes and decisional processes within and across tasks, with a focus on separating perceptual from decisional attention processes. With only a few additional parameters associated with the identification and categorization decision processes, the matching perceptual distributions provided a good account of the pattern of identification confusion, decisional integration, and decisional selective attention categorization problems. There was one caveat, however. In the decisional selective attention to brightness categorization task, categorization performance was best captured by assuming that the perceptual variance along the perceived brightness dimension was reduced relative to the perceptual variance along the perceived saturation dimension. This is a form of perceptual selective attention. An analogous form of perceptual selective attention was not necessary to account for the decision selective attention to saturation categorization performance. Maddox (2001) applied an analogous approach to perceptual matching, identification, and categorization performance with stimuli constructed from the separable dimensions of length and orientation. The present study extended this approach to the integral dimensions of brightness and saturation. The perceptual representation for 18 iso-hue color patch stimuli was derived from the perceptual matching data and held fixed in an attempt to model simultaneously data from the identification and categorization tasks. The matching task perceptual representation was compared with the freely estimated identification perceptual representation in terms of its ability to account for the identification and categori- zation data. Both the matching and identification perceptual representations provided good accounts of identification and categorization performance, with a slight advantage for the identification perceptual representation in identification and a slight advantage for the matching perceptual representation in categorization. Importantly, the advantage for the identification perceptual representation in identification came at the expense of 86 additional free parameters, whereas the advantage for the matching perceptual representation in categorization came with no additional free parameters. These results were remarkably similar to those from Maddox (2001) with separable-dimension stimuli. Taken together, the results from these two studies suggest that (a) the matching task provides an excellent method for estimating the underlying perceptual representation for separable-and integral-dimension stimuli and (b) the perceptual representation for both separableand integral-dimension stimuli remains relatively unchanged across these different but related tasks.
Maddox (2001) also tested the hypothesis that decisional selective attention categorization tasks alter both decision processes and perceptual processes by leading to a form of perceptual selective attention that reduces perceptual variance along the attended dimension, whereas decisional integration tasks alter only decision processes. Maddox found support for this perceptual selective attention hypothesis as applied to the separable dimensions of line length and line orientation. A similar test was undertaken in the current study, but with the integral dimensions of brightness and saturation. Previous research suggests that integral dimensions are processed holistically and are difficult to attend selectively, whereas separable-dimension stimuli are processed analytically and are easy to attend selectively. Using an MDS-based exemplarsimilarity model, Nosofsky (1986 Nosofsky ( , 1987 found strong selective attention to the separable dimension of size and orientation, moderate selective attention to the integral dimension of brightness, and weak selective attention to the integral dimension of saturation in decisional selective attention tasks. Unfortunately, within the framework of Nosofsky's model, perceptual and decisional attention effects are nonidentifiable. Using GRT, we were able to determine the locus of such selective attention effects. We found that observers' ability to apply a decisional selective attention strategy was approximately equal for brightness and saturation but that perceptual selective attention was more prevalent and of a greater magnitude when brightness, as opposed to saturation, was the relevant dimension. Taken together, these results suggest that the difference in attentional processing observed by Nosofsky (1987) was probably due to differences in the magnitude of perceptual selective attention and not to differences in decision processes.
Implications of Color Coordinate Systems for Perceptual and Decisional Attentional Processes
The results of the current study suggest two obvious questions. First, why do perceptual attentional processes operate more efficiently along the brightness dimension than along the saturation dimension? Second, why do decisional attentional processes operate equally efficiently across brightness and saturation? To address these issues, some background on the dimensions of color is in order. In cognitive psychology, it is often argued that the dimensions of the Munsell color system (i.e., hue, saturation, and brightness) represent the true perceptual dimensions of color (e.g., Nosofsky, 1987) . Although the Munsell color system was developed through the use of psychophysical techniques in an attempt to identify psychologically meaningful dimensions (Munsell, 1915; Newhall, Nickerson, & Judd, 1943) , color scientists acknowledge the existence of other color systems such as the Natural Color System (NCS; see Brainard, 1995, in press , for reviews). NCS assumes lightness, red-green, and blue-yellow dimensions. The tristimulus coordinates for a color specified in Munsell can be derived from the tristimulus coordinates specified in NCS by applying the appropriate transformations (Brainard, 1995, in press) . One fact that is relevant to the current discussion is that the brightness dimension in the Munsell system maps (in a one-to-one fashion) onto the lightness dimension in NCS. The same cannot be said for the saturation (or hue) dimension. For example, a fixed value of saturation from the Munsell system does not map onto a fixed value of, say, red-green or blue-yellow.
Although speculative at this point, several comments are in order. First, because brightness maps in a one-to-one fashion onto lightness in NCS, it seems reasonable to suppose that, however defined, brightness denotes a fundamental property (or dimension) of the color vision system. In light of this fact, it seems likely that an observer should be able to accurately apply a decisional selective attention strategy to this dimension and, more important, that a sharpening or tuning of the perceptual representation along this dimension (i.e., perceptual selective attention) can occur when decisional selective attention is optimal. Second, because saturation does not map in a one-to-one fashion onto a single dimension in NCS, it seems reasonable to suppose that saturation does not denote a fundamental property (or dimension) of the color vision system. In light of this fact, it seems likely that attentional processes would operate less efficiently when this dimension is highly relevant to solving the task. Although post hoc, the results of the current study suggest that the fact that saturation is not a fundamental dimension of color makes the perceptual attentional system operate less efficiently while leaving the decisional selective attention system relatively intact.
Finally, these results suggest a number of interesting lines of potential research. One potentially informative approach would be to have observers perform decisional selective attention tasks along the dimensions of color systems other than the Munsell system (e.g., NCS; for related work from visual search, see Nagy & Cone, 1996) . Decisional selective attention performance across color system dimensions could be compared in an attempt to identify the dimensions that show the strongest perceptual and decisional selective attention. These decisional selective attention tasks could be supplemented by including the matching task as a means of estimating the underlying perceptual representation. Although color stimuli have been studied extensively in detection and discrimination tasks, only a few identification and categorization tasks have been conducted with these types of stimuli.
Neurobiology of Decision Processes in GRT
In GRT, the experienced observer learns to divide the perceptual space into response regions and assigns a single response to each region. Ashby and colleagues (Ashby et al., , 2001 Ashby & Waldron, 1999 ) offered a neuropsychological theory of the GRT decision process as applied to vision (for an extension of the theory to audition, see Maddox, Molis, & Diehl, 2002) . To summarize, visual stimuli are represented perceptually in high-level visual areas such as the inferotemporal cortex (IT). IT cells project in a many-to-one fashion into the striatum (specifically, the tail of the caudate nucleus; J. Wickens, 1993) . It is assumed that a low-resolution map of the perceptual space is represented among these striatal units. With experience, each striatal unit becomes associated with a particular response. Thus, the striatum can be thought of as associating a response with a cluster of visual cortical cells. On each trial, the observer determines which unit is closest to the perceptual effect and provides the associated response. Ashby and Waldron (1999) referred to this model as the striatal pattern classifier. Note that the processing assumptions of the striatal pattern classifier are identical to those used earlier in modeling identification and are similar to those used to model categorization (discussed next), thus providing a neurobiologically plausible model of the decision processes used in identification-categorization. 4 
Neurobiology of Attention in Identification-Categorization
The current findings and those of Maddox (2001) indicating that decisional selective attention tasks can alter both perceptual and decisional processes, whereas decisional integration tasks affect only decisional processes, add to the growing body of empirical support for the notion that attention can operate at both perceptual and decisional levels (Johnston et al., 1995; Pashler, 1989 Pashler, , 1991 Pashler, , 1993 Posner, 1993; Posner et al., 1989) and extend these results to the categorization of both integral-and separable-dimension stimuli (see also Maddox, Ashby, & Waldron, 2002) . They also converge with the results of Ashby et al.'s (1998) recently proposed neuropsychological theory of categorization that postulates two separate and competing categorization systems, one dominated by explicit categorization rules and the other dominated by implicit categorization rules. The implicit system is modeled by the striatal pattern classifier and thus relies on a perceptual representation computed in a visual area (IT or lower). The verbal system uses a representation from object-based working memory (thought to be in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; Baddeley, 1995) .
Current theories of visual selective attention postulate separate attentional effects in visual areas, in IT, and in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (e.g., LaBerge, 1995) . Thus, the perceptual representation used by the explicit system receives different (but overlapping) attentional processing than the representation used by the implicit system.
It is likely that decisional selective attention conditions are dominated by explicit rules. For example, in the DSAB condition, the observer should respond "A" to dim stimuli and "B" to bright stimuli. Linear and nonlinear conditions, on the other hand, are probably dominated by the implicit system (because no explicit rule exists that could adequately solve these categorization problems). Because the perceptual representations for the explicit and implicit systems receive different (but overlapping) attention processing, it is possible that the representations would be affected differently. Although tentative, this reasoning applies adequately both to the current study involving integral dimensions and to the Maddox (2001) study involving separable dimensions. Even so, more work is needed to bridge the gap between traditional studies of categorization and the growing interest in cognitive neuroscience.
In conclusion, the current study applied GRT to the relations among perceptual matching, identification, and categorization of highly integral-dimension stimuli. GRT contains parameters associated with perceptual and decisional processes that are separate and identifiable. GRT also acknowledges separate perceptual and decisional attention processes. Excellent accounts of the identification and decisional integration categorization data were obtained by assuming changes in the response regions across tasks but a fixed perceptual representation derived from perceptual matching. Decisional selective attention categorization tasks led to the use of a decision strategy that placed more weight on the relevant dimension. Decisional selective attention led to strong perceptual selective attention along the brightness dimension and moderate perceptual selective attention along the saturation dimension. These findings suggest that a complete understanding of identification and categorization performance requires an understanding of perceptual and decisional processes. 4 The importance of the striatum in visual identification-categorization is supported by the neuropsychological, neuroimaging, and animal literatures. For example, patients with striatal damage (e.g., patients with Parkinson's or Huntington's disease) show deficits in categorization learning (e.g., Filoteo, Maddox, & Davis, 2001a , 2001b Knowlton, Mangels, & Squire, 1996; Knowlton, Squire, Paulsen, Swerdlow, Swenson, & Butters, 1996; Maddox & Filoteo, 2001 ). Poldrack, Prabhakaran, Seger, and Gabrieli (1999) found striatal activation during performance of a probabilistic category task. In addition, caudate lesions in rats and monkeys disrupt a form of identification learning (McDonald & White, 1993 Packard, Hirsch, & White, 1989; Packard & McGaugh, 1992) .
